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(ALMOST) EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Charles F. C. Ruff* 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 3 volumes (with pocket parts). By Wayne R. 
LaFave and Jerold H. Israel St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 
1984. $211. 
Professors and students, defense counsel and prosecutors, judges 
and clerks - all have been waiting for someone to produce the 
"Corbin" or "Prosser" of criminal procedure. Virtually every other 
field of the law has its definitive work or works. Major areas of crimi-
nal procedure have been the subjects of learned treatment in law re-
views, and endless numbers of casebooks have been prepared for 
classroom use. Prospective consumers assumed that the law was de-
veloping too rapidly, particularly in the critical area of search and 
seizure, to justify the investment of time and money in the preparation 
of a full-blown treatise. Yet equally volatile subjects generated every-
thing from one-volume texts to looseleaf services to multivolume 
tomes. 
If taxes and securities and employment discrimination merited 
their own treatises, why not criminal procedure? Again, the untutored 
have assumed that the market would not support the product - that 
sales would be limited to law school libraries, some large firms, a few 
criminal practitioners successful enough to afford more than a manual 
for solving routine day-to-day problems, and a smattering of other 
lawyers interested enough in the general subject to invest in a good 
working reference. Without exploring the vagaries of the publishing 
business, one can only guess what it was that finally convinced West 
Publishing to leap into the breach. Whatever their motive, the result 
is an important work - not Corbin or Prosser, but valuable 
nonetheless. 
Users of treatises seldom spend much time reading prefaces and 
introductions; they leap directly to the substance, caring little about 
why the authors have done what they have done or what theoretical 
goals they have tried to achieve. Nor have these authors provided any 
temptation for the reader to linger over their opening pages, which 
consist of a brief preface and the usual tributes to those who assisted in 
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the research and typing. The reviewer, searching for guidance as he 
attempts to test the authors' purpose against their performance, is 
given only the following: 
We have sought in these three volumes to analyze the law governing all 
of the major steps in the criminal justice process, starting with investiga-
tion and ending with post-appeal collateral attacks .... We have also 
sought to go beyond describing "the law" as it currently stands, explor-
ing as well its historical roots and underlying policies. [P. III.]1 
With this limited explanation, it is difficult to judge whether 
Professors LaFave and Israel have succeeded either in achieving their 
own goals or in meeting the expectations of their readers. One who 
has dabbled in academia, spent most of his career as a prosecutor, and 
recently come to the private practice of law, can appreciate this work 
for what it offers - clear and concise analysis and an eminently usable 
resource for student, teacher and practitioner. At the same time, from 
whatever perspective one views it, one is left with an odd sensation 
that, in trying to be all things to all readers, this treatise is not quite 
right for any. 
On the one hand, no one will spend his spare hours reading 
LaFave and Israel either for new insights into the jurisprudence of 
criminal procedure or for that special argument that will mean victory 
in the courtroom. On the other hand, although it will not regularly be 
cited in briefs or in judicial opinions, lawyers and law clerks will have 
it close by when the moment comes to begin their research. 
I do not intend to damn with faint praise. Our firm library had a 
copy ofLaFave and Israel on the shelves within days of its availability, 
and I can conceive of no well-stocked law school, law firm, court or 
government library that will long be without it. Yet one cannot help 
but wonder if that is what the authors hoped for. Did they envision 
their work on a professor's desk, well-thumbed and spine broken from 
repeated use? Did they see the trial lawyer dashing into the library for 
one last look before going into the courtroom? Did they expect their 
book to engender lively debate with challenging analysis and novel ap-
proaches to old problems? It is hard to tell. 
Recognizing the enormity of the task before them and the prospect 
that the legal ground would be shifting constantly beneath their feet, 
the authors have sought out a compromise: almost every conceivable 
issue is at least briefly touched upon; the critical areas are explored in 
some depth; and the reader is given a foundation for additional re-
search. Like all compromises, however, this one will leave some read-
1. The authors describe a division of responsibility which seems to have left Professor 
LaFave with the bulk of the substantive material and Professor Israel with the general introduc-
tory chapters (Chs. 1, 2), the grand jury (Chs. 8, 15), right to counsel (Ch. 11), discovery (Ch. 
19), and appeal and collateral attack (Chs. 26, 27). P. IV. 
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ers dissatisfied, the extent of that dissatisfaction depending on their 
expectations. 
Volume 1 of the treatise consists of ten chapters covering the core 
fourth, fifth and sixth amendment issues - search and seizure, inter-
rogation and identification. Volume 2 covers the pretrial process, in-
cluding appointment of counsel, release, the decision to prosecute, and 
such lesser topics as venue, joinder and speedy trial, as well as discov-
ery, guilty pleas, and the right to fair trial. Volume 3 covers briefly the 
trial process itself, double jeopardy and sentencing; the remainder of 
the volume is taken up with appeals and collateral review, and an ex-
tensive appendix of rules and statutes. 
The reader who comes to these volumes looking for a description 
of the law as it is ( or at least as it was in July 1983, the cutoff date for 
Supreme Court opinions), will find a reliable and clearly written analy-
sis of virtually every aspect of the criminal process. The coverage of 
no area is so thorough that the researcher can rely on it as exhaustive, 
but signposts to the open issues are well marked, and the reader will, 
at worst, find the text and citations a handy starting-place for further 
inquiry. 
If, however, one comes looking for the jurisprudence of criminal 
procedure, one will find that, with a few notable exceptions, there sim-
ply is not much room for theory in the midst of the densely packed 
descriptive material. One exception is the extraordinarily well-written 
discussion of the constitutional theories underlying the Supreme 
Court's criminal procedure decisions (pp. 55-129). Professor Israel 
has provided in some seventy pages a lucid history of the development 
of selective incorporation and related doctrines - a history which 
could well substitute for the opening sections of casebooks that track 
the same process through severely edited cases and textual footnotes 
or serve as a guide for the student who is trying to bring some order to 
a semester's wanderings in the byways of the typical criminal proce-
dure course. 
If there was any area of criminal procedure that presented the au-
thors with a risk of rapid obsolescence, it was the exclusionary rule, 
and they have, in fact, found themselves with a text written when the 
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in the "good faith" cases2 but 
published after those decisions had been announced. As the text now 
stands, the authors have in some five pages (vol. 1, pp. 136-41) set out 
and rejected the various arguments against the rule, ranging from the 
more emotional claims of those who would free the police from its 
"handcuffs" to the proposals of the Chief Justice in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents. 3 The notion of a "good faith" exception pro-
2. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 
(1984). 
3. 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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posed by Justice White in dissent in Stone v. Powell 4 is given equally, if 
more moderately, short shrift, and the Court's refusal to adopt such an 
exception in Taylor v. Alabama5 and United States v. Johnson, 6 fol-
lowed by its avoidance of the issue in Illinois v. Gates, 7 is seen as sig-
nalling the death of the "good faith" campaign. 
The authors make only passing reference to the Fifth Circuit's 
adoption of a "good faith" exception in United States v. Williams, 8 
certainly a case worth more detailed discussion if one were attempting 
to predict the outcome of the Supreme Court's debate. The grants of 
certiorari in Massachusetts v. Sheppard 9 and United States v. Leon 10 
are flagged in a brief footnote (vol. 1, p. 140 n.58), and the suggestion 
that a warrant-based exception be adopted is left with only the com-
ment that, "[d]oubtless some would oppose [it]" (vol. 1, p. 141). 
Whether or not it would have been possible in July, 1983, to pre-
dict the results in these cases, a somewhat more elaborate discussion 
would at least have mitigated the impact of the early publication date. 
As it is, a substantial portion of the exclusionary rule chapter has be-
come irrelevant and will remain so until the publication of the first 
pocket-part.11 The reader with little or no expertise in the field runs 
the risk of being misled, while the experienced reader will simply by-
pass this section of the treatise until it catches up with the state of the 
law. 
The body of the chapter on "Arrest, Search and Seizure" (vol. 1, 
pp. 130-359) provides a clear and concise overview of the fourth 
amendment that will be useful for the student or the lawyer newly 
come to the area. For the prosecutors in the audience it must be noted 
that, when the authors move from the descriptive to the analytical, 
their commentary has a certain defense orientation. Even for defense 
counsel, however, their criticism tends to focus on the merits of 
Supreme Court decisions now well ensconced rather than on current 
issues still being litigated in the lower federal and state courts. This 
problem, one supposes, is unavoidable in a treatise that seeks to cover 
so much ground in such limited space. 
An odd organizational decision has placed the introductory discus-
sion of the exclusionary rule (vol. 1, pp. 130-62) at the beginning of the 
section on "Detection and Investigation of Crime," and the discussion 
of standing, fruits and the exceptions to the rule some 600 pages away. 
4. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
S. 457 U.S. 687 (1982). 
6. 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
7. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
8. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). 
9. 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984). 
10. 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). 
11. Since the writing of this review, the 1985 pocket parts have become available. - Ed. 
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In between come presentations on wiretapping, interrogation, identifi-
cation, the grand jury and, strangely, entrapment. This arrangement 
is unlikely to prove troublesome to those who know what they are 
looking for and can simply turn to the appropriate subsection, but 
again the neophyte may wonder why it is not possible to present a 
more integrated analysis of the subject. 
In addition to its odd placement, the discussion of entrapment is 
more extensive than is justified by the importance of the purely legal 
issues and yet inadequate in its coverage of the current controversy. 
The public debate over the entrapment defense in recent years has 
made it one of the most controversial issues in the law of criminal 
procedure - perhaps second only to the exclusionary rule. The au-
thors devote a considerable amount of space to the origins of the de-
fense in Sorrells v. United States12 and Sherman v. United States, 13 and 
to the "debate" over the "subjective" and "objective" theories. They 
treat that debate, however, as though it had considerably more real-
world significance and continuing vitality in the courts than the typi-
cal practitioner would perceive. 
The discussion of the "Abscam" cases in this context is brief but 
telling (vol. 1, pp. 428-29). In addressing the question of whether law 
enforcement officers should be required to have some "reasonable sus-
picion" that an individual is engaged in criminal activity before offer-
ing him inducement to do so, the authors recognize the adverse 
implications of United States v. Russell. 14 They point to Abscam, 
however, as a source of "renewed interest in this issue" (vol. 1, p. 428) 
because "there a convicted swindler and other middlemen who were 
themselves under investigation decided which politicians would be of-
fered bribes" (vol. 1, p. 428). This highly simplistic description of the 
Abscam scenario then leads to brief citations to Representative Ed-
wards, the prime congressional critic of the operation (vol. 1, p. 428 
n.18), and to an article in The Nation that proposes the use of a war-
rant procedure.15 Only in a footnote is it mentioned that all attacks on 
the Abscam convictions were rejected by the courts of appeals (vol. 1, 
p. 428 n.19), and no mention is made of the one dispassionate congres-
sional study of the operation.16 
In the real world the entrapment defense has meaning only in the 
extraordinary cases - the DeLorean prosecution, for example - and 
even in those the defense has meaning less as a legal issue than as a 
12. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
13. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
14. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
15. V. 1, p. 429 n.20 (citing Chevigny, A Rejoinder, nrn NATION, Feb. 23, 1980, at 205). 
16. SENATE SELECT CoMMITTEE TO STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVmES OF CoMPONENTS 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT, s. REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). 
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vehicle for attacking the government's tactics and evoking some sym-
pathy for an otherwise unsympathetic defendant. In routine drug 
cases, where entrapment has most often been raised and where the 
bulk of the unfavorable case law has developed, the defense virtually 
never succeeds. Yet the unsophisticated reader may well be left with 
the idea that the entrapment doctrine provides some meaningful con-
trol over police conduct. It might have been more useful for the au-
thors to have analyzed the facts of the Abscam cases and the juries' 
and courts' responses to those facts in an effort to explain just why the 
defense, whatever academic appeal it may have, offers little solace to 
defendant or defense lawyer. Instead, they have provided the reader 
with citations to the critics without offering anything in the way of 
detached assessment - an approach that smacks more of advocacy 
than scholarship. 
If the authors' messages on the exclusionary rule and entrapment 
are clear, they seem in other parts of the treatise to have gone out of 
their way to avoid reaching any conclusions. For example, in their 
introduction to the chapter on the grand jury's screening function (vol. 
2, pp. 282-85), they present the arguments for and against continued 
reliance on the indictment process in what is little more than a compi-
lation of the ideas of other commentators and offer no assessment of 
their relative merits. Similarly, on the issue of plea bargaining, their 
summary of the many vices and limited but important benefits of that 
process gives the reader nothing that has not been said many times 
before (vol. 2, pp. 554-70). 
All of which is not to say that the effort has not been worthwhile. 
These volumes represent the only comprehensive work in the field. 
They are lucid and thorough. West's decision to publish and the au-
thors' decision to write are more than justified by the product. Profes-
sors LaFave and Israel can be expected to offer in other forums the 
insightful analysis of important issues that has characterized their 
other work, and while we await that day, we can be content that they 
have, for now, provided us with a first-rate reference that fills a space 
on our shelves too long left empty. 
